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To Promote the General Welfare:




In the 1960s and 1970s, progressive lawyers and scholars aggressively
campaigned to secure the recognition and protection of substantive welfare
rights. Invoking welfare as a "new property" right,' they pressed the courts
to declare affirmative guarantees to entitlements as varied as financial
assistance, adequate housing, and education. But despite an early flirtation
with recognizing a right to welfare, the Supreme Court ultimately and
soundly dismissed the claim that the Constitution protects anything on the
order of such a right.' The response of legal activists in the wake of this
1. See Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964) [hereinafter Reich, The
New Property]. Professor Reich argued that a recognition of the significant degree to which
government is involved in all facets of America's political economy should lead us to expand our
understanding of what constitutes-and therefore what should be protected as-property. Private
property affords the individual autonomous personal space. Reich suggested that those dependent
on newer forms of property, such as government entitlements, should be afforded similar
protection; without that protection, individuals' dependence on the government for their financial
well-being would leave them at the mercy of the state. Id.; see also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254, 263 (1970) (lending credence to Reich's argument with respect to the right to welfare
throughout benefit-termination proceedings); PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF
CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 1400-06 (4th ed. 2000) (describing the new property
approach to constitutional consideration of welfare rights); Charles A. Reich, Individual Rights
and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1254-55 (1965)
(characterizing the degree to which the modem political economy's property rights are tied up in
government entitlements). Moreover, property-based arguments for other new rights, including
privacy and procedural rights, see infra Parts 11-111, gave advocates of substantive welfare rights
hope that the expanding constellation of property protections would include guarantees to basic
socioeconomic resources.
2. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (refusing to recognize a constitutional
right to welfare); see also San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)
(declining to recognize a constitutional right to equal education); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56
(1972) (declining to recognize the right to shelter as a constitutional right). With respect to the
Court's brief flirtation with protecting welfare rights, I am referring to Justice Brennan's dicta in
Goldberg, in which he lent his support to the new property theory. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 263.
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defeat has been muted at best.3
This Note revisits the jurisprudential and conceptual case for
substantive welfare rights. Its objective is two-fold: to make sense of the
failed attempts4 to incorporate substantive welfare rights into our
constitutional canon and to propose an alternative legal foundation for
promoting those rights.
The history of the substantive welfare rights campaign, I argue, reveals
a great flaw in strategy. To be sure, the Court proved willing to expand the
traditional conception of property to cover new rights. Under its expanded
view of property, the Court recognized privacy rights in the form of
inviolable personal autonomy as well as procedural rights in the form of
unobstructed access to the courts and polls. It is not, however, surprising
that the Court refused to extend similar protection to substantive welfare
rights. The line the Court drew was not arbitrary.' Privacy and procedural
rights comport with the traditional Lockean protections of private property
and negative liberties that are deeply embedded in our constitutional order.
In contrast, substantive welfare rights are completely anathema to the
Lockean tradition. The guarantee of welfare, after all, requires the
government to take affirmative steps to redistribute private holdings. It is
unimaginable that the Court would have, or would now, embrace an
3. See Mark A. Graber, The Clintonification of American Law: Abortion, Welfare, and
Liberal Constitutional Theory, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 731, 745-46, 811-12 (1997) (describing how
prominent liberals distanced themselves from the defense of affirmative welfare rights). But, for
new thoughts and perspectives on substantive welfare rights, see William E. Forbath,
Constitutional Welfare Rights, 69 FORDHAM L. REv. 1821 (2001); and Stephen Loffredo,
Poverty, Democracy and Constitutional Law, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1277 (1993).
4. For discussions of poverty lawyers and their courtroom strategies, see MARTHA F. DAVIS,
BRUTAL NEEDS 10-21 (1993); JACK KATZ, POOR PEOPLE'S LAWYERS IN TRANSITION 79-81
(1982); Forbath, supra note 3, at 1855-63; and Edward Sparer, The Right to Welfare, in THE
RIGHTS OF AMERICANS 68, 68-83 (Norman Dorsen ed., 1971). Professor Loffredo broadly
recounts the failure to incorporate welfare rights into our constitutional canon, offering
explanations from conservative, moderate, and liberal schools of thought. Loffredo, supra note 3,
at 1277.
5. See, e.g., ELIZABETH BUSSIERE, (DIS)ENTInTLING THE POOR: THE WARREN COURT,
WELFARE RIGHTS, AND THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION 90 (1997) (describing the Court's
discipline in limiting its expansive equal protection jurisprudence to process rights involving
criminal justice and voting). But see Graber, supra note 3. Graber does not concede there is a
qualitative legal difference between rights of privacy and rights to substantive welfare. In his
provocative article, he refers to the failure to incorporate substantive welfare rights while
guaranteeing privacy rights as the "Clintonification" of American jurisprudence. Graber invokes
Clinton iconographically, casting the constitutional disjunction between protected privacy rights
and unprotected welfare rights in politically expedient terms: Privacy is privileged and
championed by elites, who are willing to leave the nonvoting, nonmobilized poor to their own
devices. id. at 733-36. In suggesting that the major differences between privacy and welfare rights
are political rather than legal, Graber typifies an unwillingness among scholars to recognize that
welfare rights may, in fact, be quite different from privacy and procedural rights and may be
better situated in an alternative legal framework.
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understanding of "new property" that required redistribution, for that
would undermine the traditional protections of "old property." 6
Substantive welfare rights must then be placed on a more secure
theoretical foundation. I argue that such a foundation can be found in the
values of civic republicanism that infuse our Constitution and that have
only become more resonant as the country has grown more inclusive. Civic
participation and political engagement have always been critical concerns,
even imperatives, of our republican community. The recent scholarship of
the "republican revival" has certainly corroborated this reading of our
history.' This revival has not yet influenced welfare theory. But it should.
We must recognize that individuals lacking the basic socioeconomic
resources necessary for effective political engagement cannot approach, let
alone meet, our ideal of republican citizenship. Without some base level of
education, health care, housing, and financial security, citizens cannot
possibly be expected to vote, to deliberate, and to serve on juries as
effectively as our system asks and expects. I argue therefore that we must
view welfare rights through the lens of civic republicanism. Then we will
see that welfare rights should be protected as citizenship rights.9
6. See JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM 223 (1990) (describing the incongruity of situating substantive welfare
rights within a property framework).
7. See infra Part V. Several authors have referred to the synthesis in our constitutional order
between liberal and republican values. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 21-26, 32-
33, 46-50, 59-61, 65-76, 81-116, 120-24, 163-80, 302 (1998) (arguing that the Bill of Rights
consisted of republican-inspired protections, designed to help promote local democratic activity,
which only fully became countermajoritarian liberal protections after Reconstruction); J.G.A.
POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT 506, 513, 523, 527-45 (1975) (emphasizing the
republican values that infuse and inform our ostensibly liberal Constitution and constitutional
culture); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 562,
593, 606-15 (1969) (highlighting the expansive republican values that were embraced during the
Revolutionary period and their influence on the Founding); Daniel T. Rogers, Republicanism: The
Career of a Concept, 79 J. AM. HIST. 11, 12-25 (1992) (describing the scholarly community's
nascent recognition of America's "republican synthesis"). For recent efforts to revitalize welfare
rights within the liberal tradition, see Graber, supra note 3, at 735-47, 752-70; and Loffredo,
supra note 3, at 1293-303, 1313.
8. For a discussion on the recent revival of republican constitutional thought, see 1 BRUCE A.
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 24-33 (1991). See also Linda R. Kerber, Making
Republicanism Useful, 97 YALE L.J. 1663 (1988); Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE
L.J. 1493 (1988); Cass R. Sunslein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988).
9. Note that in limiting my constellation of substantive welfare rights to those directly
connected with furthering the duties and obligations of citizenship, fewer absolute resources can
be redistributed. The previous campaign to protect welfare rights envisioned those rights as
neutral. The government should be agnostic with respect to beneficiaries' consumption patterns.
For illustrations of the undifferentiated pursuit of substantive welfare rights, i.e., neutral rights,
see JAMES T. PATTERSON, AMERICA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST POVERTY, 1990-1994, at 162-67
(1994); and MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT 286 (1996). See also King v.
Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968) (rejecting the policy of midnight checks on families to see if there
was a man in the home of a woman receiving welfare); Forbath, supra note 3, at 1851-54, 1871-
72 (highlighting the welfare rights movement's goal to secure "a generous income untethered to
work"). By tying welfare to civic participation, I leave myself exposed to criticism by liberals
uncomfortable with the fact that assistance is granted, but only with strings attached. Yet, I
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This Note begins by investigating the circumstances under which
property was expanded to cover new rights. Part II examines privacy rights
jurisprudence. Part III extends this analysis to procedural rights. Then, in
Part IV, I examine the unsuccessful campaign to protect substantive welfare
rights as property rights. After describing the failure to incorporate welfare
rights on the heels of the more successful battles to secure privacy and
procedural rights, I reconceptualize and reconstruct a case for substantive
welfare rights in Part V. I hope to locate a foundational justification for
these rights within a republican-participatory context. Methodologically,
through textual and structural interpretations of our evolving constitutional
system, I attempt to erect a constitutional bridge that is synthesized from
various participation-reinforcing amendments, sociopolitical movements
aimed at promoting civic engagement, and aspirational ideals for
community. This constitutional bridge will lead us to recognize the need to
consider greater support for affirmative welfare rights as necessities of
citizenship. In Part VI, I conclude by briefly considering the possibilities
and difficulties associated with recognizing a legislative imperative to
operationalize these citizenship welfare rights.
II. PRIVACY AS PROPERTY
In this Part, I describe briefly how certain privacy rights have been
incorporated into our constitutional canon, largely through conceiving those
new rights as intimately linked to the sacrosanct rights of property. The
progressive effort to protect bodily integrity, focused for our purposes on
procreative rights and expressive intimate associations, stems from an
older, more conservative effort to ensure the integrity of an individual's
physical holdings. In building upon the traditions of property, privacy rights
advocates were able to tap into libertarian strands of constitutional thought
and, in the process, carve out a greater sphere of personal autonomy and
inviolability.
contend that absent a political shift in the terrain, the most plausible and compelling way to
articulate a legal (let alone moral) imperative to our nation's legislators and judges is to insist that
those affirmative rights are necessary for effective civic and political participation. We can do
that, as I intend to do, by grounding those citizenship rights in our constitutional system. Absent
that connection, there simply is not legal-let alone popular-support for neutral welfare rights.
See, e.g., Peter Edelman, The Worst Thing Bill Clinton Had Done, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar.
1997, at 43; Christopher Edley, Jr., Editorial, Value Judgments, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1996, at
A25; Sign It, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 12, 1996, at 7.
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A. Why Employ a Privacy Analysis?
I use both privacy and procedural rights as the substantive welfare
rights movement's foil."0 Privacy advocates successfully harnessed liberal
property-based arguments to secure constitutional rights to procreative and
personal freedoms. By liberal property-based arguments, I mean arguments
that invoke those sets of traditions and values inherent in our constitutional
system that privilege and protect individuals and their intimate possessions
from encroachment or interference. Litigation attempting to secure a
constitutional right to substantive welfare rights as property rights,
however, proved less successful."
In effect, privacy and procedural rights are jurisprudential analogues
while privacy and substantive welfare rights are jurisprudential opposites.
The protection of individual privacy is a process of safeguarding the right to
noninterference. It involves the carving out of a negative space into which
no one may encroach. The protection of procedural rights follows in a
similar vein. The security of substantive welfare fights, on the other hand,
requires community engagement and affirmative sacrifices. The community
must not only not interfere, it must actively intervene. 2 The diametrically
opposed obligations and impositions that these two sets of rights demand
represent, in important ways, the differences between positive and negative
rights in our political and constitutional orders.
A liberal framework of constitutional rights to property protects the
private holdings that substantive welfare rights advocates seek, in essence,
to redistribute. Thus, the justification for welfare rights that inescapably
involve redistribution must emanate from alternative legal concepts and
traditions, those we find to be more affirmative: the rights and duties of
citizenry embedded in our constitutional system. In situating welfare rights
within a democratic, participatory context rather than a property-focused,
rights-based context, we can limit the starkness between acts and omissions
10. For our purposes, substantive rights as conceived during the litigation of the 1960s and
1970s include the previously undifferentiated second and third bundles of welfare rights. See
SANDEL, supra note 9, at 286-87 (characterizing welfare fights advocates as insistent on a no-
strings-attached right to welfare benefits).
11. See infra Part IV; see also PATTERSON, supra note 9, at 157-84 (describing the legislative
gains welfare rights advocates secured); FRANCES Fox PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, POOR
PEOPLE'S MOVEMENTS 264-361 (1979) (describing the Welfare Rights Organization's activities);
FRANCES FOX PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR 196-97 (1993)
[hereinafter PIVEN & CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR] (describing the confluence of
socioeconomic events in the 1960s that led to the legislative welfare expansion).
12. Frank Michelman's distinction between possession and distribution may be helpful. We
usually think of our property fights as negative claims to keep government and our fellow citizens
out-not as positive claims to a share. It is an "antiredistributive principle, opposed to
governmental interventions into the extant regime of holdings for the sake of distributive ends."
Frank I. Michelman, Possession vs. Distribution in the Constitutional Idea of Property, 72 IOWA
L. REV. 1319, 1319 (1987). This analysis is brought into further relief in subsequent Parts.
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that is central to the negative rights doctrine of classical liberalism standing
in the way of affirmative welfare rights. 13 Thus, while privacy and welfare
rights might seem mutually compatible, if we are to draw privacy rights
from the strain of the Founding thought centering on property rights-and
welfare rights from the inclusive republicanism embedded in our
constitutional architecture-we can come to terms with the problems
inherent in situating welfare squarely within the liberal tradition, a tradition
opposed not only to government takings but also to government
redistribution.
Once we place substantive welfare rights in this alternative
constitutional context and establish the inexorable link that makes various
welfare rights a necessary condition for full and active participation in
public affairs, we can give practical meaning to our republican
constitutional norms and rely on their authority to petition legislators to
provide the basic resources necessary for meaningful civic engagement.
B. Understanding Privacy Through the Canon of Neoliberal
Property Rights
There is a nearly a priori connection between Anglo-American social
contracts and the inviolate status of property. 4 Locke believed that
individuals possessed "a natural right to their property before they entered
civil society, and since they entered society to make their property more
secure, they can never be understood to have given the magistrate carte
blanche to 'dispose of it as he thinks good."' '" This view occupies a
dominant position on the American constitutional horizon, often
dominating in fact the redistributive (property-taking) perspective
13. See ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118, 121-22(1969); David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 864,
865-66 (1986); see also DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195(1989) ("The [Due Process] Clause is phrased as a limitation on the State's power to act, not as a
guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security. It forbids the State itself to deprive
individuals of life, liberty, or property without 'due process of law,' but its language cannot fairly
be extended to impose an affirmative obligation on the State to ensure that those interests do not
come to harm through other means.").
14. See Michelman, supra note 12, at 1328 ("Property, with its long history of common-law
elucidation and its naturalistic imagery ... was [the] Atlantic legal culture's very model of a
private sphere rightfully guarded against human encroachment[s] .... "); see also JOHN LOCKE,
Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 119-21, 129-32 (W.S. Carpenter ed., Everyman 1990) (1690)(highlighting the centrality of property rights in a liberal state); ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY,
STATE, AND UTOPIA 9-12, 150-64, 175-82 (1974) (affirming the centrality of Lockean liberalism
in Anglo-American society). This connection, of course, has been challenged most notably by
John Rawls. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (5th ed. 1973) (using a social contractanan
model to arrive at a liberal egalitarian posture conducive to redistributive efforts).
15. ROGERS M. SMITH, LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 23 (1985)
(quoting John Locke); see also LOCKE, supra note 13, at 119-21, 129-32 (articulating the
preeminent liberal conception of property rights).
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underlying welfare rights. By recognizing the central place of property in
the Lockean state and appreciating the liberal elements of our Founding
compact," we can easily draw a distinction between libertarian property
rights and some types of rights linked to participatory government. To
protect those citizenship rights, as discussed in Part V, we must develop a
similarly intuitive understanding of civic engagement grounded in our
Constitution's republican values.
The movement from property to privacy in its proto-modern form was
motivated in part by Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren. 7 Incidents of
modernity compelled this pair to push the definitional boundaries of
protected property beyond the physical and tangible to the more intimate
and personal. Brandeis and Warren argued that while in earlier times the
law gave remedy only for physical interference with life, liberty, and
property, modernity demanded that our conception of property be extended
beyond the material." They spoke of the right not to be owned or possessed
by others and thus conceptualized property in the form of personhood. They
referred to this expanded notion of property, which includes "all
possession, including all rights and privileges," as personality inviolate. 9
16. In a Lockean world, "liberalism... limits the state to protecting individual rights which
allow each person privately to pursue his own sense of happiness.... Human fulfillment thus
seems to be regarded as ultimately an individual experience." SMITH, supra note 15, at 49. This
liberal view of the state-and of humankind-can be contrasted with a thicker conception of an
individual in society, specifically, as an Aristotelian political actor who is self-actualized only
through participation in the polis. Id. at 47-48; see also Michelman, supra note 12, at 1327-29
(describing property rights as the "paradigm of the constitutionally protected private sphere").
17. Louis D. Brandeis & Samuel D. Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890) (responding to the perceived invasion of privacy associated with the advent of newspaper
photography and the concomitant rise in media celebrities). Tocqueville's characterizations of
American life represented an even earlier recognition of the intuitive links between property and
privacy. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 506-08 (J.P. Mayer ed. &
George Lawrence trans., Anchor Books 1969) (1835).
18. Brandeis & Warren, supra note 17, at 195 ("The intense intellectual and emotional life,
and the heightening of sensations which came with the advance of civilization, made it clear to
men that only a part of the pain, pleasure, and profit of life lay in physical things. Thoughts,
emotions, and sensations demanded legal recognition ... ").
19. Id. at 211. Personality inviolate expresses a conception of a personal sphere. This sphere
may not necessarily be territorially grounded. See id. at 214-15. In Olmstead v. United States,
Brandeis offered the judicial articulation of this position, one that bridges traditional conceptions
of property with modem matters of privacy:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit
of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings
and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of
life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect Americans in their
beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against
the government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the
right most valued by civilized men.
277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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C. Ushering Privacy into Our Times
By protecting procreative freedom, including the rights to
contraceptives and abortions, the modem Court has recognized privacy as a
fundamental right safeguarded by the Due Process Clause."0 Monumental
decisions protecting procreative freedom including the right to
contraceptives and to abortions have brought privacy rights to the
constitutional fore. The Justices' conception of privacy is essentially a
modem application of a traditional theory of individual autonomy updated
over time to meet the concerns and needs of a progressing society:
Contraceptives and abortions are expressions of inviolate bodily territory."'
The protection of intimate relations and bodily integrity is a significant
jurisprudential step, but one that is, in fairness, a logical extension of
traditional property protections.2 The extension of privacy along these lines
evokes a fundamental interest in pursuing one's own ends without
government interference.13
In staking out a right to privacy, judges have relied on Justice
Cardozo's famous description of due process in the Palko24 and Snyder"
cases, in which the concept of due process translated into a substantive
guarantee.26 This construction further justifies the incorporation of privacy
rights: The right to order one's familial and intimate relationships must
20. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (reaffirming the Court's decision
to protect abortion rights); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (recognizing abortion as a
constitutionally protected privacy right); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (protecting the
sexual privacy of consenting adults to use contraception); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965) (recognizing a fundamental right among married couples to use contraceptives). But see
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (failing to protect the right to engage in homosexual
sodomy).
21. See Helen Garfield, Privacy, Abortion, and Judicial Review, 61 WASH. L. REV. 293, 312
(1986) (claiming that Griswold and Roe both fit into a right-to-privacy, due process paradigm).
22. By permitting unmarried couples to use contraception, Eisenstadt carved out an even
greater sphere of nonintrusion that permits not only greater autonomy of activity, but also greater
autonomy in choosing those with whom to engage. 405 U.S. at 446.
23. See id. at 453 n. 10 (quoting Oinstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)); see also
1 ACKERMAN, supra note 8, at 159 ("[Wjhen the Founders thought about personal freedom they
used the language of property and contract; given the New Deal repudiation of this language,
doesn't the language of privacy provide us with the most meaningful way of preserving these
Founding affirmations of liberty in an activist welfare state?"). Notice that in making this move,
judges have rejected an affirmative jurisprudential role for protecting economic rights.
24. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937). In Palko, Justice Cardozo refused to overturn
a state law that allowed the state to appeal a legally erroneous acquittal in a criminal case.
Cognizant that this appeal would be unavailable at the federal level because of the Fifth
Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause, Cardozo differentiated various rights in the Constitution,
prioritizing some rights such as free speech over others including double jeopardy.
25. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) (limiting the Fourteenth Amendment
due process protection to only those rights "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people as to be ranked as fundamental").
26. See SMrrH, supra note 15, at 71-72. For Justice Cardozo, some substantive guarantees
were implicit in the notion of ordered liberty; without them, neither liberty nor justice would exist.
Palko, 302 U.S. at 325.
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exist as a societal baseline. And, as I show in Part III and Part IV, this
concept of ordered liberty embraces certain procedural rights, but not
substantive welfarist resources. These procedural rights, like those
affirming the right to privacy, center on negative protections from
burdensome governmental interference.
III. PROCEDURAL RIGHTS AS PROPERTY
Building upon Part II's exploration of privacy rights and their
grounding in property notions, I now discuss the procedural rights
jurisprudence to highlight the problems associated with looking to property
rights to secure substantive welfare rights. This Part underscores the legal
differences between procedural and substantive rights, situates procedural
rights alongside privacy rights (under the constitutional umbrella of
fundamental property-based rights), and compels the reconceptualization of
substantive rights on alternative footing.
Constitutionally protected procedural rights involve freedom from
undue government interference, in which a deprivation of personal liberty is
at stake. These rights equip individuals with the tools necessary to live
freely and, as such, include the right to counsel in criminal trials and the
right of access to the courts when one's liberty interests are at stake. To
some extent, procedural rights may be viewed as sliding into the realm of
substantive welfare rights. Mandating the waiver of court fees and the
appointment of defense attorneys do help the poor and do, inevitably,
involve redistribution. But in truth, these procedural rights impinge on
matters of economic justice only tangentially. Their focus instead is on
negative liberties, ensuring individuals are not unduly deprived of their
legal rights. They touch directly upon what Brandeis called personality
inviolate.
A. Procedural Rights: Criminal Procedure and Privacy
It is instructive to begin with those rights that sit at the intersection of
criminal procedure and privacy, thus providing a bridge connecting these
two Parts of the Note. The recognized right to bodily integrity with respect
to police searches and seizures represents a milestone in liberal protection.
Here, the fundamental interest in bodily privacy converges with the
fundamental interest in liberty-violating searches that may lead to
prosecution and incarceration. In Rochin v. California, the Court held that
drug evidence forcefully obtained by violating the bodily integrity of the
defendant must be held inadmissible under the Due Process Clause of the
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Fourteenth Amendment. 7 Justice Frankfurter argued that to struggle to
open a suspect's mouth and forcibly extract his stomach's contents "shocks
the conscience.... [Tihis course of proceeding by agents of government to
obtain evidence is bound to offend even hardened sensibilities."28
In Mapp v. Ohio,29 the Court expanded the scope of protection against
coercive seizure by grounding it in terms of the Fourth Amendment's
protection against unreasonable searches as well as the Fifth Amendment's
ban against compelled self-incrimination. 3' Finally, in Miranda, the
criminally accused were held to be affirmatively entitled to protection
against self-incrimination.31 Under Miranda, arresting and prosecuting
officers must explicitly inform those taken into custody of their right not to
speak.32 This step represented a procedural turning point. The constitutional
right against self-incrimination had existed for almost two hundred years,
yet in 1966 the Court decided the government had an affirmative obligation
to remind the accused of this longstanding right.
B. Procedural Rights: Affirmative Access to Courts
The rights limiting the aggressiveness of criminal searches are negative
ones. Just as government cannot outlaw abortions, it cannot extract
evidence in an overwhelmingly coercive manner. Nor can government deny
access to the courts. Yet though our constitutional rights so far have been
primarily negative to the extent they invoke protections against state action
and encroachment,33 opening up access to the courts requires the
government to take affirmative, resource-distributing steps.' 4 For example,
in the pre-Gideon35 era, the constitutional right to counsel was thought to
prohibit the government from denying a defendant her right to counsel
whom she herself retained.36
27. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
28. Id. at 172.
29. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
30. Id. at 646-47; see also id. at 661-62 (Black, J., concurring); cf. Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (speaking to the merits of bridging amendments and claiming that a
fight may lie within the overlapping zone of coverage of several fundamental constitutional
guarantees).
31. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
32. Id. at 455-58.
33. See Peter B. Edelman, The Next Century of Our Constitution: Rethinking Our Duty to the
Poor, 39 HASTINGS L. 1,25 (1987).
34. See SMITH, supra note 15, at 84.
35. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (reading the Sixth Amendment to guarantee
the right to state-provided counsel for accused felons).
36. See Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 471-72 (1942) (holding that a state's refusal to appoint
counsel for an indigent defendant charged with a felony did not necessarily violate the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause).
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But more recently, the Warren Court placed affirmative obligations on
government to facilitate access to the courts when fundamental interests of
liberty were at stake. Although these rights seemingly move us toward
affirmative welfare provision, poverty, in truth, remained incidental to the
Court's reasoning. This affirmative jurisprudence focusing on liberty rights
stopped well short of recognizing substantive welfare interests. Providing
basic resources as part of a negative effort to prevent liberty deprivations is
a bounded step. It did not extend any further; for example, it did not provide
resources as a foundation for affirmative expressions of liberty.37
Yet within its bounded step, the Court nevertheless recognized that
simply ensuring open access to the judicial system is insufficient. The
Court, accordingly, has articulated a thicker notion of procedural justice,
compelling states to provide transcripts to indigent defendants who appeal
their convictions" as well as to provide counsel to indigents facing criminal
charges.3 9 In Griffin v. Illinois, the Court waived appellate fees for
indigents, but its effort to protect procedural justice did not include any
explicit redistributive objective.' Because the negative liberty interest at
stake in Griffin was so salient, the Court insisted that government provide
affirmative resources. Likewise, in Douglas, the Court recognized that
"equality is not required .... But where the merits of the one and only
appeal an indigent has as of right are decided without benefit of counsel,
we think an unconstitutional line has been drawn between rich and poor."4 1
Finally, in Gideon, the Court emphasized the fundamental liberty interest at
stake (to remain free from incarceration), not the fact of poverty per se.42
37. By affirmative expressions of liberty, I mean notions of civic republicanism that consider
participation in the democratic process and polity to be a necessary condition of being free. See
infra Part IV.
38. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). Griffin held that when a state grants appellate
review it must do so in a way that does not discriminate against some convicted defendants on
account of their poverty. Meaningful appellate review requires that the appellants have the
resources to present an effective argument. "Both equal protection and due process emphasize the
central aim of our entire judicial system-all people charged with crime must... 'stand on an
equality before the bar of justice."' Id. at 17 (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241
(1940)).
39. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (invalidating California's investigatory
procedure for determining which indigents deserved appointed counsel); Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
40. 351 U.S. at 17. Justice Black signaled that no heightened scrutiny would be employed in
reviewing legislation affecting the poor. Id. at 17-18; see also Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc.,
348 U.S. 483 (1955) (employing only a rational review standard for matters of economic
regulation); United States v. Carotene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (declaring the
Court's intent to use rational review for all legislation except when fundamental rights or discrete
and insular minorities were involved).
41. 372 U.S. at 357.
42. In Gideon, Justice Black argued:
[L]awyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries.... [We, the Justices,] have
laid great emphasis on procedural and substantive safeguards designed to assure fair
trials before impartial tribunals in which every defendant stands equal before the law.
This noble ideal cannot be realized if the poor man charged with crime has to face his
accusers without a lawyer to assist him.
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Yet we appreciate the subtle difference between opening court access and
demanding affirmative welfare resources only with the benefit of hindsight.
At the time, the Court's bounded limits were not in sight. As such, it made
sense for welfare advocates to believe that their opportunity to secure
affirmative resources was nearing.4 3
C. Procedural Rights: Ordering One's Familial Relations
Within a short time span, the Court extended protected rights beyond
the literal interest in freedom from incarceration and embraced a
fundamental interest in ordering one's intimate family relations, specifically
marital and parental ties that touch upon personhood in vitally important
ways.' For instance, the Court held that states must waive divorce fees for
indigent couples.45 As there is no other way to dissolve this most intimate
and fundamental social bond than through the state judicial machinery, a
lack of resources for court fees unconstitutionally excludes indigents from
the only forum effectively authorized to settle their disputes.4"
Similarly, procedural justice demands an affirmative allocation of
resources to help maintain parental rights pending the outcome of a
termination hearing. In M.L.B., the Court overturned the dismissal of an
appeal by an indigent woman lacking the court fees to challenge a
termination-of-parental-rights order.47 The Court held that there is, in fact, a
fundamental interest in retaining family ties. This interest was seen by the
Court as equal in importance to the right to participate in political processes
as voters as well as the right of access to effective criminal defense. "The
interest of parents in their relationship with their children is sufficiently
fundamental to come within the finite class of liberty interests." 48
It is important to note that the Court did not lightly extend these
affirmative protections into civil cases. But "[c]hoices about marriage,
family life, and the upbringing of children are among associational rights
[the] Court has ranked as 'of basic importance in society,' rights sheltered
372 U.S. at 344.
43. See, e.g., Douglas, 372 U.S. at 356-58; Griffin, 351 U.S. at 18-20; id. at 34 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (suggesting that the state had simply failed "to alleviate the consequences of
differences in economic circumstances that exist wholly apart from any state action" and thus the
majority's endeavor was primarily a redistributive one, centering on securing substantive welfarist
rights); see also BUSSIERE, supra note 5, at 87 (contending that the Court did employ a higher
level of scrutiny in criminal procedure cases).
44. But see Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31-32 (1981) (holding that the
interest in maintaining parental relations was subject to a balancing consideration).
45. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
46. Id. at 376-77 (" [The] resort to the judicial process by these plaintiffs is no more voluntary
in a realistic sense than that of a defendant called upon to defend his interests in court.").
47. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996).
48. Id. at 119 (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 774 (1982)).
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by the Fourteenth Amendment against the State's unwarranted usurpation,
disregard, or disrespect."49 Indeed, Justice Ginsburg's opinion explicitly
differentiated the affirmative support secured in M.L.B. from other
unsuccessful attempts to secure substantive welfare rights.5" She contended
that "M.L.B.'s complaint is of a different order. She is endeavoring to
defend against the State's destruction of her family bonds .... Like a
defendant resisting criminal conviction, she seeks to be spared from "the
State's devastatingly adverse action." 5
D. Procedural Rights: Taking a Step Back
These cases involving procedural rights-but having economic justice
implications-intimated that the Court was incrementally ushering in a new
era of affirmative rights protections. These cases did, after all, touch upon
rights closely connected to substantive welfare rights. And in the arc of
liberal democratic history, the protection of civil rights, including access to
the courts, tends to precede the protection of political rights.5" Therefore,
might it not be fair to expect the courts to facilitate political participation in
ways similar to their effort to facilitate access to the judicial process?
In the end, however, no new era of substantive welfare expansion was
to be realized. The lesson that must be taken from this survey of proto-
substantive rights was that the protected rights were confined to those
impinging on fundamental interests rooted in the constitutional values and
mores of negative liberty. 3 Thus the protected rights required affirmative
government provisions, but they primarily involved promoting liberty and
protecting, in essence, one's property in maintaining negative liberty.
Indeed, the "Warren Court never pursued the implications of its economic
equal protection holdings outside cases like these, where the equal
49. Id. at 116 (quoting Boddie, 401 U.S. at 376).
50. See id. at 125; see also DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S.
189 (1989) (rejecting the argument that the state is liable for failing to provide affirmative
protections to its citizens); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (upholding the federal denial of
Medicaid funding for abortions); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (upholding a similar state
legislative denial of funding). In the latter two cases, the Court held that while Roe v. Wade
protects women from unduly burdensome interference with their freedom to decide whether to
terminate their pregnancies, it implies no limitation on legislatures' choices to support those
decisions.
51. M.LB.,519U.S. at 125.
52. See Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of
Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1129-31 (1997); see also AMAR, supra
note 7, at 216-18, 258-61 (discussing the distinction between civil and political constitutional
rights).
53. See Frank L Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Foreword: On Protecting the
Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 29-30 (1969).
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protection issues were so entangled with other claims of fundamental rights
as to prevent clear-cut social egalitarian rulings." 54
Poverty per se did not galvanize judicial action in the cases discussed in
this Part.55 This assertion can be supported by looking at the Court's less
sympathetic treatment of the poor in court-fee cases that do not involve a
fundamental liberty interest. In United States v. Kras, the Court held that
the government does not have to waive the fees of a poor appellant filing
for bankruptcy.56 Since bankruptcy was a purely economic matter, the
litigant's limited access to the courts did not raise constitutional concerns. 7
Indeed, only liberty rights, defined to include privacy and property
protection, have motivated the courts to demand affirmative governmental
assistance. Thus a willingness to employ a redistributive remedy has been
limited to those instances where such affirmative treatment is necessary to
prevent the violation of those liberty rights.5"
E. Segue into Substantive Rights?
Two problematic cases that do not fit fully into procedural rights-nor
in the substantive welfare category discussed below-involve promoting
positive expressions of liberty by enhancing one's ability to act
affirmatively in society. They do not involve the threat of a liberty
deprivation at all. Thus, these two cases and the rights they protect, if
viewed without the hindsight history affords, would be construed as proto-
substantive welfare successes. But history has shown that the subsequent
circumscription of these holdings relegates these rights to a hybrid
category: something more than procedural but less than substantive.
In Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, the Court supported voting
rights by holding poll taxes unconstitutional.5 9 While the Court would not
54. SMrrH, supra note 15, at 161.
55. See Rebecca E. Zietlow, Exploring a Substantive Approach to Equal Justice Under Law,
28 N.M. L. REv. 411, 438 (1998).
56. 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
57. The Court, reasserting that the waiver of fees in civil matters is the exception, not the
rule, held:
Kras' alleged interest in the elimination of his debt burden ... does not rise to the same
constitutional level [as Boddie]. If Kras is not discharged in bankruptcy, his position
will not be materially altered in any constitutional sense.... We see no fundamental
interest that... [attaches to] a discharge in bankruptcy.
Id. at 445 (citations omitted).
58. See BUSSIERE, supra note 5, at 90 ("For poor people the promise of the wealth-
discrimination rulings lay in the justices' apparent willingness to rectify economic inequalities
that impinge on fundamental rights or interests .... [But] the Court had not applied the strict
scrutiny test outside the... domains of criminal justice and political procedures."); Michelman,
supra note 53, at 25 (emphasizing that cases involving pecuniary discrimination in which the
Court intervened were limited to those involving "the interests in voting and in access to the
machinery of justice in criminal cases").
59. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
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consider obstacles to voting as severe a liberty deprivation as was the
absence of counsel in a criminal proceeding, it nevertheless took steps to
eliminate financial impediments to the exercise of the franchise. "Voter
qualifications have no relation to wealth nor to paying or not paying this or
any other tax." ' Previously, the Court had upheld restrictions on the
franchise, including a literacy requirement. 6' But in Harper, the Court
distinguished wealth; unlike literacy, wealth has no rational relation to the
vote.62 Although wealth was singled out for its irrelevance, the Court
applied only a rational basis test, thus reasserting its belief that poverty
should not be afforded heightened judicial scrutiny.63 The Court focused its
attention on the right at stake, not the class of persons affected.' After all,
neither the Court nor its petitioners made a further effort to seek the
allocation of affirmative resources, such as bus fare to the polls.65
Second, though often placed in the category of procedural justice,
Goldberg v. Kelly66 made considered reference to notions of affirmative
rights to welfare, citing Charles Reich's article on welfare as a new form of
property. 67 The Goldberg Court recognized that economic resources were
necessary to indigents preparing for hearings to contest the termination of
their welfare benefits. Essentially, the Court held that welfare benefits
should continue to be paid out to those preparing their termination appeal:
60. Id. at 666.
61. Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959) (unanimously
upholding North Carolina's literacy requirements).
62. Harper, 383 U.S. at 666. But see JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIsTRUST 120
(1980) (arguing that wealth discrimination in voting is not irrational, but does freeze the poor "out
of the decision process for an insufficiently compelling reason"); Robert J. Steinfeld, Property
and Suffrage in the Early American Republic, 41 STAN. L. REV. 335 (1989) (detailing a long
history during which wealth, or the lack thereof, was closely linked to voting agency).
63. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356-58 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12,
18-20 (1956); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); cf San Antonio
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (denying the existence of a constitutional right
to equality of education financing); Dandridge v. Williams 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (denying the
existence of a constitutional right to welfare benefits). As I discuss below, the Court in Rodriguez
and Dandridge refused to apply heightened scrutiny in matters involving poverty and
impoverished individuals. For scholarly treatments of Carolene Products, see, for example,
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 8-7, 11-2, 1 -4, at 582-83, 772-74,
778 (2d ed. 1988); Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713
(1985); Louis Lusky, Footnote Redux: A Carolene Products Reminiscence, 82 COLUM. L. REV.
1093 (1982); and Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Carolene Products Revisited, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1087
(1982).
64. Harper, 383 U.S. at 667 (asserting that the right of suffrage is fundamental in a free and
democratic society, and that the exercise of the franchise preserves other basic civil and political
rights).
65. With their Harper decision, the Justices "more likely saw themselves completing the
dismantling of Jim Crow, than identifying the first 'islands of [economic] haven' on a
constitutional map of basic needs and just wants." Forbath, supra note 3, at 1871 (quoting
Michelman, supra note 53, at 33).
66. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
67. Reich, The New Property, supra note 1, at 733.
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[T]ermination of aid pending resolution of a controversy over
eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by
which to live while he waits. Since he lacks independent resources,
his situation becomes immediately desperate. His need to
concentrate upon finding the means for daily subsistence, in turn,
adversely affects his ability to seek redress from the welfare
bureaucracy.68
In one swoop, the Court extended resources beyond those directly
connected with access to a legal process and elevated the importance of
welfare procedural hearings to the same protected echelon as voting and
criminal trials.6 9 This affirmative right is qualitatively different from those
granting the in-kind equivalent of the cost of court transcripts or the poll
tax. Justice Brennan's dicta are even more revealing in terms of the
possibilities of recognizing a general basket of minimal resources necessary
to participate fully in society:
Welfare, by meeting the basic demands of subsistence, can help
bring within the reach of the poor the same opportunities that are
available to others to participate meaningfully in the life of the
community.... Public assistance [is] a means to "promote the
general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves
and our Posterity" [and] pre-termination evidentiary hearings are
indispensable to that end.7"
This holding was not to be built upon, and the dicta were quickly
repudiated.7' Despite the allusions to a Reichean sense of welfare as
property, in less procedurally driven welfare cases the Court declined to
extend a constitutional right to basic resources. Ultimately, there must be
some highly significant procedural justification for the courts to order the
government to grant any affirmative rights.
IV. SUBSTANTIVE WELFARE RIGHTS AS PROPERTY RIGHTS
In this Part, I discuss the Court's unwillingness to protect substantive
welfare rights. The unsuccessful litigation involving substantive welfare
rights72 tested the limits of the procedural rights described in Part HI.
68. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264.
69. Edelman, supra note 33, at 36-37 ("'[AFDC was] the means to obtain essential food,
clothing, housing, and medical care ... the very means by which to live."' (quoting Goldberg,
397 U.S. at 264)); see also JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
106-13, 164, 264-71 (1985) (putting the utility of substantive resources in a procedural context).
70. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 265.
71. See infra Part IV.
72. For an examination of welfare advocacy, see DAVIS, supra note 4, at 65-91; and Sparer,
supra note 4, at 65-93.
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Ultimately the failure to secure substantive welfare rights is a testament to
the inability to expand on Goldberg's holding.73 Essentially, the Court
refused to consider the denial of affirmative resources to be a sufficient
liberty or property deprivation to warrant judicial intervention.74 At stake in
the privacy and procedure cases were fundamental property rights. This
designation was not extended to affirmative welfare provisions.
In confirming this assertion, I attempt to compel a reconceptualization
of substantive welfare rights that moves us away from the historical Anglo-
American privileging of property and toward thicker notions of citizenship
embedded in our original framing and consistent with our evolving
constitutional project in democracy. 5
A. Neutral Welfare Rights and the Failed Property Paradigm
These cases begin and end with Dandridge v. Williams.76 In Dandridge,
the Court upheld Maryland state legislation designed to impose a family
cap on welfare benefits. In effect, after a certain cut-off, the birth of
additional children into families already on welfare would not lead to
increases in the families' benefit packages. In deciding Dandridge, the
Court refused to extend Justice Brennan's Goldberg dicta to protect welfare
benefits in circumstances in which those benefits were disconnected from a
liberty-threatening procedural matter. Without a fundamental property or
liberty interest hanging in the balance, the Court decided to treat the welfare
benefits as it would any other statutory economic regulation.77
Dandridge held: "In the area of economics and social welfare .... if the
classification has some 'reasonable basis,' it does not offend the
Constitution simply because ... 'it results in some inequality."' 7 The
Court conceded that though welfare programs try to alleviate poverty, they
73. See Forbath, supra note 3, at 1856.
74. See BUSSIERE, supra note 5, at 90 ("The Justices' ability to muster support for its [sic]
wealth-discrimination opinions was due mainly to the Court's articulation of a shared belief in
American political culture regarding the impropriety of inequality in the criminal justice and
democratic processes.").
75. See Forbath, supra note 3, at 1867-68 (describing the need to reorient welfare advocacy
away from a basic need jurisprudence and toward a more dynamic, distributive justice one).
76. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
77. See id. at 484. The Dandridge Court reasoned:
[H]erc we deal with state regulation in the social and economic field, not affecting
freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and claimed to violate the Fourteenth
Amendment only because the regulation results in some disparity in grants of welfare
payments to the largest AFDC families. For this Court to approve the invalidation of
state economic or social regulation as "overreaching" would be far too reminiscent of
an era when the Court thought the Fourteenth Amendment gave it power to strike down
state laws "because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a
particular school of thought."
Id. (quoting Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955)).
78. Id. at 485 (quoting Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911)).
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must be scrutinized as any other economic regulation would be-no
differently from, say, a congressional regulation on the automotive
industry.79 Thus at the end of the day, a day not far from the triumph of
Goldberg, the Court held the fight to welfare to be well outside the ambit of
constitutional protection."
B. Post-Dandridge Retrenchment
Dandridge effectively wiped out any substantive value Goldberg
contained. It held that welfare, divorced from a critical procedural hearing,
was not a protected right.8' The landslide continued with the Court
subsequently holding that the right to basic shelter similarly did not rise to
the level of constitutional canonization." In that housing battle, welfare
advocates grounded their arguments, again, in property-like language to no
avail. In dissent, Justice Douglas contended, "Modern man's place of
retreat for quiet and solace is the home .... [I]t is his sanctuary. Being
uprooted and put into the street is a traumatic experience." 
83
Moreover, in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,
84
the Court refused to protect the right to equal education. But though the
Court rejected Rodriguez's argument, the case offers a glimmer of
optimism for reconceptualizing affirmative rights in some thicker
conception of republican participatory democracy rather than liberal
79. The Court opined:
[T]he intractable economic, social, and even philosophical problems presented by
public welfare assistance programs are not the business of this Court. The Constitution
may impose certain procedural safeguards upon systems of welfare administration. But
the Constitution does not empower this Court to second-guess state officials charged
with the difficult responsibility of allocating limited public welfare funds among the
myriad of potential recipients.
Id. at 487 (citations omitted); see Graber, supra note 3, at 776 (describing the Court's refusal to
involve itself in socioeconomic policymaking); see also Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S.
483 (1955) (employing only a rational review standard for matters of economic regulation);
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) (declining to use heightened judicial
scrutiny in reviewing economic policy); W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937)
(" Even if the wisdom of the [economic] policy be regarded as debatable and its effects uncertain,
still the legislature is entitled to its judgment.").
In dissent, Justice Marshall took exception to the relevance of the longstanding Williamson
holding: "This case, involving literally vital interests of a powerless minority-poor families
without breadwinners-is far removed from the area of business regulation." Dandridge, 397
U.S. at 520.
80. For scholarly support of the Dandridge Court's position, see Robert H. Bork, The
Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the Constitution, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 695; and Ralph
K. Winter, Jr., Poverty, Economic Equality, and the Equal Protection Clause, 1972 SLIP. CT. REV.
41.
8 1. Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 485-87.
82. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (rejecting the claim that the need for shelter rose
to the level of a fundamental interest that would demand heightened scrutiny).
83. Id. at 82 (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also id. at 74 (majority opinion).
84. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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property rights. Condoning the differences in school funding between
relatively poor and affluent school districts in San Antonio, the Court held
that to warrant judicial intervention, there must have been an absolute
deprivation of a constitutionally fundamental interest harming a definable
category of poor people. 5 The Court acknowledged that San Antonio
provided a "quantum" of education, 6 which the majority considered
sufficient. Moreover, the group systematically harmed by the asymmetric
funding was not homogeneously poor.87 Yet the Court did intimate it would
be alarmed if a modicum of education were not guaranteed. 8  And it further
intimated that poor people were not systematically discriminated against;
some of San Antonio's poorest resided in better-funded districts, and some
of San Antonio's middle class resided in the city's worst-funded districts.
Given a different fact pattern, in which a more serious educational
deprivation harmed only the very poor, the Court might decide a school-
funding case differently.
The Rodriguez Court contemplated protecting education as a possible
fundamental right89 before ultimately asserting that its "social importance is
not the critical determinant for [triggering] strict scrutiny." 9 The Court
remained unsympathetic to Rodriguez's claim that unlike other social
services, such as housing and welfare, education is (more) closely and
directly connected to the effective exercise of fundamental rights including
voting and political expression. Accordingly, it reiterated the classic
distinction between acts and omissions:
The Court has long afforded zealous protection against unjustifiable
governmental interference with the individual's rights to speak and
to vote. Yet we have never presumed.., to guarantee to the
citizenry the most effective speech or the most informed electoral
choice. That these may be desirable goals... is not to be
85. See id. at 17.
86. Id. at 36.
87. Id. at 23; see also SMITH, supra note 15, at 162 (concluding that the Court determined
that "the law worked no absolute deprivation, since the poor did receive some education... and it
did not necessarily work chiefly against the poor, since many of them resided in property-rich
districts").
88. Indeed, the Court rejected the reasoning of Griffin and Douglas as inapposite because
there was no absolute deprivation. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 24.
89. The Rodriguez Court wrote:
"[Education] is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal
instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later
professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these
days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is
denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity .. must be made
available to all on equal terms."
Id. at 30 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)).
90. Id. at 32.
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doubted .... But they are not values to be implemented by judicial
intrusion into otherwise legitimate state activities.91
In refusing to confer fundamental status on these affirmative resources
we colloquially consider to be fundamental, the Court continued its
overemphatic protection of what Professor Charles Black referred to as
"elite" rights, such as privacy, which are inescapably conditioned on one's
possession of baseline socioeconomic resources.92  Indeed, Justice
Marshall's dissent in Rodriguez recognized education as necessary for the
practical exercise of political and expressive freedoms and thus deserving
of consideration as a fundamental right.93 For our purposes, Justice
Marshall's dissent represents the judicial high-water mark for the case of
citizenship-related substantive republican welfare rights:94
As the nexus between the specific constitutional guarantee and the
nonconstitutional interest draws closer, the nonconstitutional
interest becomes more fundamental and the degree of judicial
scrutiny applied.., must be adjusted accordingly.... The exercise
of the state franchise is closely tied to basic civil and political rights
inherent in the First Amendment.... Only if we closely protect the
related interests from state discrimination do we ultimately ensure
the integrity of the constitutional guarantee itself. This is the real
lesson that must be taken from our previous decisions involving
interests deemed to be fundamental.95
Justice Marshall went further than seeking just a modicum of
education;9 6 he sought equal education:
91. Id. at 36; see also id. at 37 ("How... is education to be distinguished from the
significant personal interests in the basics of decent food and shelter? Empirical examination
might well buttress an assumption that the ill-fed, ill-clothed, and ill-housed are among the most
ineffective participants in the political process.").
92. The Court's protection of rights to be free from denials of liberty-not the more
affirmative right to life, liberty, and happiness-led Charles Black to remark that "[Iliberty is very
often made into a mocking simulacrum by poverty." Charles L. Black, Jr., Further Reflections on
the Constitutional Justice of Livelihood, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1103, 1105 (1986).
93. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 102-03 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Professor Ackerman argues,
"Public education has become a fundamental part of the process by which we pass our democratic
values to the next generation. If we do not provide the young with a solid education in democratic
citizenship, our larger project in self-government will not endure." Bruce Ackerman, Ackerman,
J., Concurring, in WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID 100, I11 (Jack M.
Balkin ed., 2001). Ackerman considers West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624 (1943), to be as much about the fundamentality of education as about free speech.
Ackerman, supra, at 112.
94. See SMITH, supra note 15, at 163; see also infra Part V (supporting a constitutional
imperative to protect certain welfare rights as rights owed to citizens).
95. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 102-03 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
96. See id. at 87.
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[Tihis Court has never suggested that because some "adequate"
level of benefits is provided to all, discrimination in the provision
of services is therefore constitutionally excusable. The Equal
Protection Clause is not addressed to the minimal sufficiency but
rather to the unjustifiable inequalities[,]... mandat[ing] nothing
less than that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated
alike.97
Justice Marshall focused explicitly on inequality, not inadequacy, and
thus may have taken his (and our) eye off the ball. Marshall indicated that
education should be an equal protection concern rather than one of due
process.98 And it is here that I believe the progressive movement has found
jurisprudential and political trouble: Although equal protection arguments
make sense with respect to an immutable trait such as race, the suspect
nature of poverty is more fleeting. American jurisprudence has focused on
poverty only insofar as it impinges on one's negative freedoms. Whereas
race as a category is a priori problematic-for reasons of social,
institutional, and historical bigotry-poverty does not have to be treated as
a particularly congenital problem. Once poor children are effectively
schooled and nurtured, they possess the skills and should have access to the
resources to contribute effectively in the polis. To insist on an affirmative
right to full economic equality is to hold out for too much, for access to the
political process may hinge on sufficient education, housing, and health
care, but does not hinge on completely leveling all playing fields. To hold
out for equality is to hold on to the wrong constitutional theory." To hold
out for equality is to alienate the political branches that ultimately must, if
reform is to occur, embrace our alternative theory. This impulse is hardly
fatal. I discuss it only so far as to suggest that the aspirations of my project
are more modest.
C. Substantive Rights: Taking a Step Back
Dandridge was the deathblow to the welfare-as-property movement,
and Rodriguez seemed to provide similar closure to the legal strategy of
claiming certain resources as necessary to enjoying fundamental rights. Yet,
97. Id. at 89 (internal quotation marks omitted).
98. Marshall seems to be holding out for neutral, unconditional welfare rights instead of more
modestly linking education to participation in public affairs. See id. at 90.
99. Marshall himself conceded the constitutional limitations of wealth-based classifications:
It is true that Griffin and Douglas also involved discrimination against indigents, that is,
wealth discrimination. But... the Court has never deemed wealth discrimination alone
to be sufficient to require strict judicial scrutiny .... Thus, I believe Griffin and
Douglas can only be understood as premised on a recognition of the fundamental
importance of the criminal appellate process.
Id. at 102 n.61.
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as I explore below, these cases do leave opportunities open to stake a claim
for stronger welfare rights as citizenship rights. Justice Powell's
concession, in Rodriguez, that a quantum of education may be
constitutionally protected left the door open, and a new rhetoric and
understanding of participatory republicanism may provide an impetus to
cross that threshold.
V. CARVING OUT CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS FROM REPUBLICAN TRADITIONS
In modern welfare jurisprudence, the courts have relied
overwhelmingly on a liberal, property-centered reading of the Constitution.
This reading privileges negative rights and helps open doors to facilitate
procedural justice. But it has failed to convince the Court to make any leap
of faith, however logical that leap seems to be, to support those
foundational rights necessary for individuals to engage in participatory
democracy. Yet to deny the possibility of a constitutional imperative to
promote these foundational rights is to deny the existence of robust
republican values in our political and constitutional order. With regard to
substantive welfare rights, there has not been sufficient consideration of
either our republican traditions or the inclusive democratic progress the
country has made in expanding the franchise, promoting political
participation, and enhancing economic justice.
Our republic's moral legitimacy is steeped in its democratic
inclusiveness, which has come a long way since 1787.1°° While
jurisprudential understanding of political participation has evolved over the
last two hundred years,'' our recognition of the similar need to modernize
our understanding of the interplay of economics and political participation
has lagged considerably. We take for granted the necessary relationship
between economic comfort and political participation at the time of the
Founding and thus fail to consider that not all of our participants today, in
the broadly expanded polity, have the foundational resources, say, to
summer in Philadelphia and deliberate effectively on nation-building and
constitution-writing. While foundational economic resources were not an
issue in 1787 because those included in the process were exclusively white
men of wealth and learning, today the disconnect between those broadly
eligible to participate and those who can do so effectively should be a
100. Thurgood Marshall, Racial Justice and the Constitution: A View from the Bench, in
AFRICAN AMERICANS AND THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 314 (John Hope Franklin & Genna Rae
McNeil eds., 1995).
101. See, e.g., Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (rejecting the legality
of state poll taxes); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964) (adopting the one person, one
vote standard); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) (holding that matters pertaining to the
fairness of redistricting are justiciable).
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source of concern and a call to reconsider some of the assumptions about
what baseline resources are necessary for individuals to be participating
citizens.
This Part ultimately seeks to develop an affirmative theory of
citizenship welfare rights premised on the assertion that republican values
built into our constitutional order should permit us to go beyond the
bounded holdings of Griffin and Goldberg, provided of course we frame the
constitutional rights in terms of only those actually necessary for the
fulfillment of the democratic project rather than the broad satisfaction of
property wants.
A. Republican Values: Some Initial Caveats
Although there is a rich and diverse literature on republican values, 02
this Note has been describing them simply but roughly as those social and
political traditions intimately connected to a conception of community in
which individual and group participation in civic life is not only prized but
expected. Society must be a polity, and that polity must be one in which the
demonstrative endeavor of "citizenship... appears as a primary, indeed
constitutive, interest of the person." 103 Thus republican values command
and authorize civic participation. These values, I suggest, inhere in our
constitutional system.
Any more elaborate and nuanced description would distract us from the
present inquiry. Accordingly, it makes sense to embrace the terminology
unproblematically in order to move forward with the present effort to
operationalize its underlying constitutional values and apply them to a
substantive welfare rights paradigm. Nevertheless, any exuberance
associated with the promulgation of a constitutional regime built, at least in
part, on a foundation of civic, participatory imperatives must be tempered
with a sober recognition of the analytical weaknesses that accompany this
endeavor. A republican paradigm is admittedly elusive. But this weakness
should not prove to be too troublesome. In truth, republican values are
elusive not because we do not understand them (nor because they are
lacking in textual, structural, or historical groundings), but because we have
never employed them within the context of affirmative resource allocation
102. See supra notes 7-8.
103. Michelman, supra note 8, at 1503 (1988). Michelman further posits:
Only in public life can we jointly, as a community, exercise the human capacity to
"think what we are doing," and take charge of the history in which we are all
constantly engaged .... [T]he distinctive promise of political freedom remains the
possibility of genuine collective action, an entire community consciously and jointly
shaping its policy, its way of life.
Id. at 1504 (quoting Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, Justice: On Relating Private and Public, 9 POL.
THEORY 327, 344 (1981) (citation omitted)) (alteration in original).
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in the modem welfare state. Because we have envisioned and constructed
the welfare state increasingly through the lens of liberalism, both on the
right and the left,' °4 republican norms have laid dormant and remain
unexplored at a time they are most needed.
B. Abandoning the Property Regime
To establish a stronger foundational basis for substantive welfare
resources, we first need to move outside of the liberal property paradigm.
The poverty lawyers of the previous generation wanted to "reconstitute the
constitutional meaning of property by tying it to the (related) values they
want[ed] to promote, such as political participation, privacy, and
autonomy." 05 This focus on property reflected a faith in the possibility of
using the tradition itself to effect radical change. Indeed, one concern with
deviating from the property strategy was that if the right to welfare were to
be contextualized outside of property-say, if it were grounded in human
rights-then the movement to promote redistributive welfare would
compete directly with traditional liberal protections of property, and the
whole legal, philosophical, and rhetorical arsenal of the American property
paradigm would work to undermine welfare rights'0 6
Yet litigating substantive welfare rights like one would litigate privacy
or procedural rights was unnatural and forced. The problems associated
with trying to frame welfare rights within a property paradigm can best be
illustrated by contrasting the foundations of the Lockean liberal state, where
property finds its traditional home, with a Rawlsian welfare state, where
substantive resource redistribution would find a more suitable home.
Professor Michelman, a major proponent of incorporating welfare fights,
has relied on Rawlsian ideas of social contract to underscore support for a
redistributive state. 7 Rawls insists we all place ourselves behind a veil of
ignorance in order to derive his "maximin" social function. °8 This
104. The major political philosophical works on modem redistribution and justice take a
decidedly rights-based approach. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY
(1978); NOZICK, supra note 14; RAWLS, supra note 14. Professor Graber in fact refers specifically
to Dworkin's explicit effort to reject any constitutional theory in support of welfare rights. Graber,
supra note 3, at 735-36.
105. NEDELSKY, supra note 6, at 223.
106. See BUSSIERE, supra note 5, at 151; see also NEDELSKY, supra note 6, at 223. Framed
in this way, it becomes more apparent that in the zero-sum game for wealth distribution, any
redistributive endeavor would require some form of illiberal taking. Indeed, it has been noted that
the Court possesses a "particular view of the nature of property rights in our society, under which
property rights are defined by the right to pre-existing ownership of property rather than by the
right to distribution of property in an equitable fashion." Zietlow, supra note 55, at 414.
107. See Michelman, supra note 53, at 14-15.
108. See RAWLS, supra note 14, at 152-57. Rawls's maximin principle, simply, seeks to
guarantee the biggest share possible of the community's resources to the least-well-off. Thus only
those policies that benefit the worst-off, however helpful to the better-off classes, are just.
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arrangement is, of course, in stark contrast with the more intuitive Lockean
social contract, which emerges naturally from decisions made by a people
actually embedded in their community." Rawls's narrative, since it
requires us to go behind a veil of ignorance and divorce ourselves from our
actual existence, is self-consciously counterintuitive. Accordingly, the need
to construct an alternative ratifying convention-going behind the veil-
suggests the difficulties inherent in positing that welfare rights stem from
the natural rights of property. Rather, if a redistributive model is to find any
constitutional resonance, it must find a home elsewhere.11
Plainly put, the idea of conferring affirmative rights is completely
inconsistent with our liberal tradition. The redistributive aspects of new
property do not sit well with old property. Yet liberalism, as intimated
above, is only one strain of our cultural and constitutional ethos. While the
welfare-rights-as-property movement failed, there is merit in looking to the
civic-participatory republican laws, traditions, and spirit that also spring
forth from our constitutional system."'
Despite the abundance of scholarship and debate on republican values,
civic republicanism has not generally informed our welfare rights
jurisprudence." 2 In what follows, I suggest that our current readings of the
109. For criticism of modem liberal egalitarians for ignoring the importance of actual social
practices and connections, see MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 52-
55 (1982); and CHARLES TAYLOR, PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES 205 (1985).
110. The move to tag welfare rights with property was, in fairness, not just a tactical move to
link progressive elements of privacy with poverty. Rather, a justification for welfare entitlements
as property was grounded in the belief that welfare resources need not come with government
strings attached-and certainly need not be linked to civic participation. In the 1960s, welfare
payments were conditioned on highly intrusive and morally dictatorial strings, centering upon, for
instance, compliance with midnight visits to evaluate the domestic living arrangements of those
receiving public assistance. See SANDEL, supra note 9, at 286 (describing the discretionary power
of welfare agents to conduct midnight raids as a double violation of individual liberty-infringing
on privacy and legislating morality); see also King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968) (holding
midnight raids to be unconstitutional).
In seeking to secure a constitutional right for welfare, especially when legislative
entitlements, including Johnson's War on Poverty and Nixon's proposed Family Assistance Plan,
were expanding, advocates were making a bold case that entitlements should not come with moral
strings attached. Thus, a constitutional canonization of welfare rights would make it difficult for
Congress not only to cut funding, but also to add burdensome eligibility requirements. See
SANDEL, supra note 9, at 286. This reading was consistent with the liberal neutrality of the time:
The poor should get their checks and be left alone to do what they want with them. See PIVEN &
CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR, supra note 11, at 374-98. Thus any effort to link welfare to
affirmative obligations of citizenship would be as anathema to this agenda as efforts to issue
welfare in the hope of improving the moral fiber of the citizenry.
I 11. See, e.g., STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC McKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 3-11 (1993);
WOOD, supra note 7, at 593, 606-15. Such an approach, it might be said, was attempted in
Rodriguez, especially in Justice Marshall's dissent linking educational opportunities to civic
responsibilities. Yet I believe the majority's rhetoric and the legal theories in support of welfare
rights were so grounded in a liberal property foundation that any ancillary efforts to tie republican
values into the argument seemed to be an afterthought rather than a fully developed constitutional
argument.
112. In one notable free speech case, the Court intimated a respect for public rights construed
with respect to republican values. Professor Loffredo highlights a particular First Amendment
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Constitution do little service, let alone justice, to notions of republican
values vis-A-vis welfare. In addition to the Founding, key constitutional
moments have done a considerable amount of work in reviving the classical
republican traditions that characterized the American revolutionary
movement. 13 These traditions, somewhat circumscribed by the hesitantly
democratic Founders in Philadelphia, have nevertheless been expanded by
their progeny in ways that deserve closer examination.114
C. Our Republican Constitutional Values
It is my contention that there is a civic republican constitutional
imperative that authorizes the protection of substantive welfare rights. We
currently do not give enough thought to what basic socioeconomic
resources are required for citizens to participate effectively in the polis.
Though not an a priori truth of liberal democratic governance, we have
come to settle on an understanding of citizenship that fails to appreciate the
synthetic connections between political engagement and economic security.
Our failure to recognize the intuitive connections between social welfare
and civic participation is largely a function of the fact that those who were
permitted to take part in governmental and political affairs in the eighteenth
century were men of land, wealth, and education. Participation in public
affairs was essentially limited to those for whom economic security was
never a concern. Yet, even though participatory rights have expanded over
time to include all adult members of our population, economic security's
decision as contemplating a more protective role the Court may play vis-i-vis the poor. In Austin
v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 668 (1990), the Court contended that
economic inequality tends to undermine legitimate democratic governance. "Austin's
acknowledgement of the structural role that money plays in American politics would seem to open
many areas of constitutional doctrine to serious question." Loffredo, supra note 3, at 1286.
Loffredo, however, uses the paradigm of this speech case to return to an internal critique of
poverty jurisprudence, in which he seeks heightened judicial scrutiny for the poor. See id. at 1287-
88 n.41.
Whereas Loffredo and I both argue for greater recognition of how economic inequalities spill
over into politics and civic life in general, I aim to reconceptualize poverty jurisprudence broadly
and generally within an affirmative, participatory framework while Loffredo sees the Austin
decision as an effort to turn back the clock and rethink the earlier welfare cases within the context
of equal protection. See id. For further connections between free speech and economic and
participatory inequality, see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), which recognized the power
money plays in the realm of politics. See also ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS 268-
89 (1995) (discussing the "collectivist" theory); Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure,
71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1408-11, 1425 (1986) (discussing the occasional need to restrict speech in
order to preserve public discourse); J. Skelly Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the
First Amendment an Obstacle to Political Equality?, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 609 (1982) (criticizing
the Supreme Court's approach to campaign finance legislation).
113. See, e.g., GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
(1991).
114. By republican values, I mean, of course, those affirmative values, rights, and duties that
are consistent with active participation in public affairs and the democratic process.
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relation to citizenship continues to be taken for granted or is altogether
disregarded. Today, every adult American has the right to vote and to hold
office irrespective of economic status. But those rights may be meaningless
if their bearer lacks the basic resources to make informed political
choices."'
Thus, while we have expanded the political role of ordinary Americans,
we have continued to rely on the Federalists' assumptions that ignore
economic realities when considering the scope of political rights.1 6 In
doing so, we have opened up the lanes of the political track to potential
participants, but have not recognized that these new runners may lack the
knowledge and training, as well as the health and nutrition, not to mention
the pair of spikes, necessary to run a real race.
Given the evolutionary and revolutionary changes made to our
Constitution over the decades and centuries since 1787, we need to
appreciate the problems of continuing to embrace the Philadelphia
Convention's indifference toward the link between economic resources and
political participation. Over time we have increasingly appreciated and
protected political rights.'1 7 This inclusive, expansionary movement has
emerged out of the recognition that the spirit of the Constitution, our
democratic practices, and our collective aspirations demand full
participation. Participation is a necessary condition in our effort to perfect
our democratic project. Yet the myopia in failing to recognize the necessary
connections between participation and economic security remains
undertheorized.
In the Sections that follow, I will conceptualize welfare as a republican
right necessary to undergird our commitment to democratic engagement.
First, we need license to support this claim. Thus, in Section V.D, I describe
my interpretive methodology and apply it in locating the strong republican
values that infuse the Constitution. Then, in Sections V.E and V.F, I take a
step back and explore the historical circumstances that explain why
citizenship welfare rights have remained dormant for so long-and why
they need, today, to be revitalized. In Sections V.G and V.H, I synthesize
the constitutional and historical arguments and arrive at a clear statement
regarding welfare fights as citizenship fights.
115. See Steinfeld, supra note 62, at 337-38, 342. Steinfeld describes the widely shared
nineteenth-century conviction that paupers ought to be disenfranchised because they lacked a
political will of their own. Essentially, it was commonly recognized that economic autonomy was
a necessary precursor to the proper exercise of the franchise.
116. See NEDELSKY, supra note 6, at 221,226.
117. See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE 4, 33-42, 172-73, 256-57 (2000).
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D. Constitutional Authorization for Substantive Citizenship Rights
I employ an interpretive methodology that looks to the overall structure
of the Constitution as informing our reading of the document. Reading, for
instance, older parts of the text in light of newer elements is vitally
important in understanding the Constitution as it exists in our times and as
it relates to our present purposes. Most prominently, Professor Akhil Amar
encourages constitutional scholars to recognize how the structure and
purpose of the Constitution add meaning to the text itself.118 Indeed,
because amendments usually do not simply rewrite old clauses, a reader
"must always scour later amendments to see if they explicitly or implicitly
modify the clause at hand." 19 Thus there seems to be interpretive virtue in,
first, a kind of "Shepardizing" of the Constitution, an appreciation that new
additions to the document may change our understanding of extant clauses.
And, second, there is also interpretive virtue in reading a series of
amendments framed and ratified within a given period of time as expressing
some purpose.
An example of Amar's theory is illustrative of the first point:
[T]he Fourteenth Amendment itself must be read in light of the
later Nineteenth Amendment. If we simply parsed the Fourteenth in
isolation, the status of women's equal civil rights might be unsure.
On one hand, the Amendment's opening section affirms the rights
of all "citizens" and "persons" and says nothing in particular
about "race" as distinct from "sex." .. .Regardless of this original
ambiguity, after the Nineteenth Amendment becomes part of the
document, we have strong documentarian warrant to construe the
Fourteenth Amendment in favor of women's rights. Once the
Constitution vests women with full and equal political rights,
shouldn't entitlement to the full and equal enjoyment of lesser civil
rights follow a fortiori? Discriminations that might once have
seemed legitimate.., bec[a]me illegitimate when the Constitution
itself, in a later amendment, affirm[ed] a very different and more
robust vision of women as full and equal members of the political
People who govern America.'20
118. Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term-Foreword: The Document and the
Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 29 (2000) (stating that later (post-Founding) "generations of
Americans have added amendments one by one, but no amendment stands alone as a discrete
legal regime. Each amendment aims to fit with, and be read as part of, the larger document").
119. Id. at 29-30.
120. Id. at 51-52; see Reva B. Siegel, She, the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex
Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 948 (2002); see also Adkins v.
Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (reinterpreting the Due Process Clause in light of the
newly ratified Nineteenth Amendment).
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With this interpretive license, we can glean from the document a
republican imperative to promote citizenship rights. Historically,
constitutional canonization of economic rights, when it has occurred, has
been intimately linked to the canonization of participatory rights, notably
expansions in the polity. We have evidence of a redistributive revolution, or
at least reformation, beginning with the Income Tax Amendment,", which
intimated the government's commitment to empowering the poor with
some resources.'22 The Sixteenth Amendment, along with the direct election
of senators"2 3 and the conferral of women's right to vote,124 were the fruits
of a progressive period in the generations following Reconstruction. If we
appreciate these expressive constitutional efforts as somewhat related, it is
hard to lose sight of the confluence of economic redistribution and political
empowerment as a galvanizing moment or series of moments. We see this
economic and political convergence with the constitutional abolition of the
poll tax 2' and the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,116 which,
though not a constitutional amendment, stands out as a monumental
legislative enactment.127 These links, however loose, suggest the implicit
connection between political and economic rights-the abolition of the poll
tax most explicitly serving to marry these two interests directly. Essentially,
I make the structuralist claim that there are strong bonds linking our
republican democratic advances with our egalitarian socioeconomic ones.
For support, I look both to pronounced trends in our historical development
and to precise deliberative moments in time.
With this interpretive framework in mind, does it not make sense to
read the democracy-enhancing and welfare-enhancing amendments
discussed in this Section as part of a larger conversation not only with each
other, but with, notably, the Fourteenth Amendment? Do not these rights,
each read as adding meaning to a larger constitutional narrative, suggest
that Americans have been thinking jointly about economic justice and
participatory democracy? Considered as a whole, these rights tell us a story
about a nation's commitment to promoting democracy and to empowering
its citizenry. If we treat these amendments as related, we might begin to see
the benefits of articulating an affirmative theory of due process citizenship
121. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
122. See AMAR, supra note 7, at 300 ("The Sixteenth Amendment was ... profoundly
redistributive, authorizing a 'progressive' income tax that would take more proportionately from
the rich than the poor.").
123. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII,
124. Id. amend. XIX.
125. Id. amend. XXIV.
126. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-I (1994)).
127. The passage of certain landmark legislation, such as the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
accelerated the progressive movement's commitment to egalitarian values "far beyond the point
where the courts could have taken it by themselves." 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 8, at 110.
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rights, bolstering the position of not only the racially disempowered, but
also the economically and politically disenfranchised.
E. The Early Marginalization of Republican Values
In this Section, I argue that the Philadelphia document did not fully
embrace the democratic, inclusive values that have subsequently emerged
from our modem constitutional system, which has changed through
amendment, practice, and judicial interpretation. With the articulation of
democratic rights extending beyond the initial level of political
participation envisioned at the Founding, the links between politics and
economics have become more complicated than they were at the time of our
nation's infancy. Accordingly, democratic values must be interpreted in
light of the fact that the resources necessary to participate effectively were
taken for granted, rather than denied, by the wealthy, educated men who
convened in Philadelphia. It is helpful to explore how our constitutional
system has changed along the path of democratization and to appreciate the
degree to which these changes should imply concomitant changes to our
implicit norms and understandings of economic security.
While over the past two hundred years we have become both more
liberal (by protecting more rights) and more republican (by promoting
greater political participation), we currently privilege our liberal
commitments over our republican ones in at least one important way.
During the nineteenth century, the franchise was widely extended, a victory
for participation."8 But it was participation divorced from another
fundamental tenet of the republican vision: community voice in important
aspects of governance.' 29 Thus, to this extent, the republican ethos was a
hollow one.13 ° Since then, participatory expectations have increased
considerably, but we must appreciate the existence of an even wider gap
that now stands between the formal possession of a political right and its
effective exercise. Among the Founders, though the franchise was
restricted, it is safe to say those who possessed political rights also
possessed the private means to avail themselves of those rights. Today, in
contrast, though the franchise is universal, many lack the basic economic
resources to use the vote (and other political rights) effectively. Indeed, we
need to look at this modem gap to appreciate that though our constitutional
128. See id. at 26-27, 52, 173, 182-83.
129. See, e.g., MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-
1860 (1977); WILLIAM NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE (1996). But see LOUIS HARTZ, THE
LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA (1955) (emphasizing the hegemony of liberalism).
130. This description is not solely based on hindsight and revisionism. Contemporaries were
cognizant of the Philadelphia regime's failure to provide public space for civic and political
discourse. See HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 238 (1963); Sunstein, supra note 8, at 1552.
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system today hints at a balance between Lockean liberalism and
Rousseauean republicanism, that balance has yet to be struck. 3 ' While the
Founders' Constitution contained the normative vision as well as the
procedural and structural arrangements that remain with us today, it fell
short in prescribing true democratic values.' If we admit there is a gap, we
will be able to confront the problems of basic want and de facto
disenfranchisement from an entirely different and potentially more fruitful
perspective.
F. Moving Beyond the Philadelphia Document
The Philadelphia document did not mention slavery directly, yet it
countenanced and even protected it.'33 It also reflected the Federalists'
belief in government by one's betters."M The first families of Virginia and
the brahmins of Boston would ponder, deliberate, vote, legislate, and lobby;
this propertied class would govern.
We have long dismissed-or at least downplayed-the elitist
application of the Madisonian vision and have in turn revised and amended
the Constitution to conform more easily with our evolved sentiments of
more inclusive democracy. On the bicentennial of the Philadelphia
document's drafting, Justice Thurgood Marshall expressed his belief about
how far we have come:
131. As Ackerman explains:
Deemphasizing Locke, [Pocock] placed the Founding against a different intellectual
background-one that ultimatcly gained its inspiration from the classical Greek polis.
Within this classical republican tradition, the fundamental challenge of human life is
not to lose oneself in the Lockean pursuit of life, liberty, and property but to join with
fellow citizens in the ongoing project of political self-government.
I ACKERMAN, supra note 8, at 28.
132. Cf. CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES 14-18 (1913) (suggesting that the Founders designed the constitutional
system with the intent to preserve their own economic interests). My argument is not, however,
Beardian. Simply put, I am attempting to revitalize the somewhat dormant participatory values
embedded in our constitutional order. See, e.g., POCOCK, supra note 7, at 527-45; Linda R.
Kerber, supra note 8, at 1664.
133. The original text contains a number of references to slaveholding. See U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 2, cl. 3 (counting slaves-"other Persons"-as three-fifths of a person for purposes of
legislative apportionment); id. art. I, § 9, cl. I (placing a twenty-year moratorium on banning slave
importation); id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 (guaranteeing sustained ownership of slaves who flee across
state lines).
134. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 82 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(advocating a republican system that "refine[s] and enlarge[s] the public views by passing them
through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest
of their country and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to
temporary or partial considerations").
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When contemporary Americans cite "The Constitution," they
invoke a concept that is vastly different from what the Framers
barely began to construct two centuries ago.
While the Union survived the civil war, the Constitution did
not. In its place arose a new, more promising basis for justice and
equality, the Fourteenth Amendment, ensuring protection of the
life, liberty, and property of all persons against deprivations
without due process, and guaranteeing equal protection of the
laws. "'35
As over time we have read the Constitution more broadly within the
framework of political rights,136 we now must contemplate more seriously
the need to undergird those political rights with a semblance of economic
security.
Simply put, in the Philadelphia document, Madison's plan-republican
or otherwise-does not reflect or speak to the political reality of today.
"[T]he government [the Founders] devised was defective from the start,
requiring several amendments, a civil war, and momentous social
transformation to attain the system of constitutional government, and its
respect for the individual freedoms and human rights, we hold as
fundamental today." '37
Our society has transformed and transcended the Philadelphia pact by
expanding political rights and taking (more) seriously our democratic
project. It was and has been easy to discern the systematic political
disenfranchisement of America and Americans. 38 But, over the years, there
135. Marshall, supra note 100, at 315, 317. Ackerman echoes Marshall's concern,
contemplating the "bicentennial myth" and positing an American false consciousness. See 1
ACKERMAN, supra note 8, at 34-35. "'[B]oth Reconstruction Republicans and New Deal
Democrats appear as the equals of the Founding Federalists in creating new higher lawmaking
processes and substantive solutions in the name of We the People of the United States." id. at 58;
see also Sunstein, supra note 8, at 1569 ("American republicanism must be understood not only
in terms of the framing period,. . .but also in terms of the Civil War Amendments and the New
Deal.").
136. See, e.g., Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (holding that a state poll
tax violated the Equal Protection Clause since wealth bears no relation to voting qualifications);
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (invalidating a state proposal to deviate from a one person,
one vote districting scheme).
137. Marshall, supra note 100, at 315. Professor Amar concurs. He challenges the notion that
even after the ratification of the Bill of Rights, "we all lived happily ever after." He thinks those
who fixate on the Founding generation possess a vision of our country that "ignores all the ways
in which the Reconstruction generation-not their Founding fathers or grandfathers-took a
crumbling and somewhat obscure edifice, placed it on new, high ground, and remade it so that it
truly would stand as a temple of liberty and justice for all." AMAR, supra note 7, at 288.
138. See TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 17, at 506-08; see also Steinfeld, supra note 62, at 339-
42 (describing efforts in American history to expand and limit the franchise).
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has been a concerted effort to enhance political and participatory rights
through legislation, amendments, and judicial interpretations that
accompany the reconstructed democratic vision.
Yet what we were unable to do, possibly because of its subtle unstated
influence on the original text, was to recognize a symmetrical link between
elite" republican" democracy and elite political economy. It was no secret
that the effort to exclude the propertyless, to exclude women, and to
exclude blacks left only wealthy, educated white men to govern. 39 Taking
for granted that these individuals enjoyed the private means to devote
resources to policy considerations, to prudent voting, to political discourse,
to campaigning, and to lobbying, there was thus no explicit concern that
Founding citizens would face any substantive obstacles limiting civic
participation. There would be no concern that these members of the bar, of
mercantile houses, and of the gentry would lack the human capital tools, the
social capital connections, and the vigor of healthy existence necessary to
participate.
Illustratively, despite the apparent weakening of the inexorable links
between property ownership and political agency, paupers remained
systematically disenfranchised throughout the nineteenth century. Their
dependent status made them unworthy to participate in self-government.
Community leaders feared that the poor, utterly lacking in socioeconomic
resources, could not deliberate prudently. But instead of empowering these
individuals, legislatures left paupers disenfranchised." ° My argument, in
truth, accepts the premises of those exclusionary community leaders but
simply takes exception with the way they resolved the dissonance between
political and economic resources.141
In the course of our nation's expansion of participatory rights, many
lawyers have been satisfied with the extant protections afforded and see
none of this dissonance. They essentially reject the premise that without
resources, one cannot effectively contribute. They encourage us to look at
free speech and access to the polls and to recognize that the doors are wide
open: A woman today, of any background, can campaign, lobby, and vote.
But while these liberty safeguards are in place, I believe they constitute
merely a supervening layer of empowerment, one that overlays a
139. As liberals are quick to point out, a communitarian-republican paradigm does not
promise universal participatory rights.
140. See Steinfeld, supra note 62, at 353, 361-66; see also KEYSSAR, supra note 117, at 130-
35 (citing numerous state laws from the 1800s imposing economic conditions on the right to
vote); Michelman, supra note 12, at 1329 (suggesting that a person without material security was
one whose vote could be appropriated by those on whom he is dependent).
141. See Steinfeld, supra note 62, at 350-53 (describing leaders as choosing to disenfranchise
the poor rather than economically empower them).
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foundation that assumes basic material needs are satisfied. 42 Michelman
asks, "Are not these [basic material] interests the universal, rock-bottom
prerequisites of effective participation in democratic representation... ?
How can there be those sophisticated [procedural] rights to a formally
unbiased majoritarian system, but no rights to the indispensable means of
effective participation in that system?" "'
Thus the democratization and republicanization of our government,
through direct election of senators'" and through the enfranchisement of
blacks,145 women,1 46 and those over eighteen years of age, 47 has been
mapped onto a constitution of negative rights that was meant to describe a
government by the haves.4 8  Professor Nedlesky's comment that an
"average" American at the time of the Founding would have been
disenfranchised even if he had the vote sounds equally applicable in
describing a poorly educated, impoverished voter today:
It would be difficult for the propertyless to get elected. It would be
difficult for them to communicate across the distances of the
federal republic and thus difficult to coordinate their plans.... It
would be difficult for them to persuade their representatives to
implement plans that shifted the rules and expectations of
entitlement in their favor ...."'
Indeed, although our country has transformed itself and prioritized
political rights when in the past it had privileged only civil rights, we have
not recognized the reforms required on the economic side of participatory
empowerment.' We have, in fairness, been adept at detecting the most
142. John Hart Ely resists this reasoning. His theory of reinforcing representative democracy
suggests that once given the franchise, individuals face no effective obstacles to the channels of
democracy. He opposes the constitutional protection of unenumerated constitutional welfare rights
because he believes welfare benefits should be determined through majoritarian deliberations.
ELY, supra note 62, at 167. "[U]nblocking stoppages in the democratic process is what judicial
review ought preeminently to be about ...." Id. at 117.
143. Frank I. Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979 WASH U.
L.Q. 659, 677. In response to Cardozo's statement in Palko that free speech "is the matrix, the
indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom," Professor Black asked "whether
the rights to freedom from gnawing hunger and from preventable sickness may not form the
'matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form' of freedom." Black, supra note
92, at 1110 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326 (1937) (Cardozo, J.)).
144. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
145. id. amend. XV.
146. Id. amend. XIX.
147. Id. amend. XXVI.
148. This mapping is somewhat awkward because while the franchise has been extended, the
ability to exercise political rights may remain limited given the poor's socioeconomic constraints.
149. NEDELSKY, supra note 6, at 146-47.
150. Professor Michelman asks:
[W]e have inherited a Constitution both republican and democratic-a Constitution that
springs, in part, from republican antecedents marked by a crucial regard for the material
independence of participant-citizens, and a Constitution that democratically rules out
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obvious demands on the government for participatory involvement, largely
centered on the vote and judicial proceedings. Yet we have ignored the
need for basic resources undergirding participation, which the Founders did
not necessarily take for granted so much as they assumed would never
present a problem as long as blacks, women, and the poor lacked a voice
and a vote in public affairs. As long as we continue to reject the premise
that those without independent resources cannot effectively participate in
self-government, we are bound to condone inequality and subordination at
the polls, in the town-hall meetings, and on the hustings.
Accordingly, we need to posit a theory that gives meaning to this open-
door policy of political inclusiveness. As Professor Michelman suggests:
Republican constitutionalism... involves a kind of normative
tinkering. It involves the ongoing revision of the normative
histories that make political communities sources of contestable
value and self-direction for their members. This tinkering entails
not only the recognition but also the kind of re-cognition-
reconception--of those histories that will always be needed to
extend political community to persons in our midst who have as yet
no stakes in "our" past because they had no access to it. 5'
It is this task that is before legislators and jurists today.
G. Acknowledging Republican Values in Our Democratic Project
Employing a set of interpretive tools to understand the constitutional
and historical evolution (if not revolution) of the imperative for civic
participation, I have argued that republican values lie at the core of our
democratic project. As Justice Marshall articulated in the bicentennial year
of the Constitution, the document we look to today no longer reflects fully
the words or the sentiments of the Founding generation. Over time, the
Jacksonian Revolution expanded the franchise, allowing those white men
who did not hold property to vote. Then, with Reconstruction, the
expansion of the franchise and the recognition of civil and political liberties
ushered in a new era of American democracy built not just on negative
rights, but on a proud appreciation for the equal moral worth of all
individuals." 2
the republican exclusionary strategy of restricting participation to the prepolitically
(relatively) wealthy. Are we, then, forced to the conclusion that this Constitution
incorporates the republican inclusionary strategy... ?
Michelman, supra note 12, at 1330-31.
151. Michelman, supra note 8, at 1495.
152. See Steinfeld, supra note 62, at 336. While the nineteenth-century movement to discredit
those who believed one needed economic security in order to possess political rights represented a
leap forward in terms of our inclusive democratic enterprise, the underlying motivations behind
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This movement toward democratization speaks to a thicker conception
of participatory government that is intrinsically meritorious. Participation
cannot be simply a defensive, negative right. In a purely liberal state not
concerned with participation and democratic process,'53  explicit
constitutional safeguards could ensure the freedmen's needs were protected
from state infringements. A paternalistic structure of protections written
into our Constitution would satisfy the classical liberals, who measure the
value of participation primarily as a protective means, safeguarding
individuals from the tyranny of the government. 1"4 Insofar as those interests
are represented, participation per se does not matter; negative property
rights could be the touchstone of minority rights. But the amended
Constitution insists on more than that. It insists on the right to political
participation.
Likewise, participatory expansion is not simply about Madisonian
pluralism designed to promote and maintain political stability through
interest-group competition. 155 Rather, the expansion was, in actuality, about
conferring moral inclusion on Americans. It was about a place at the table,
and above all, about adding voices to the policymaking process. '56
Subsequent generations have bestowed those affirmative political rights on
women, on the poor, and on all those old enough to serve in war. One of
our most recent political amendments, the Twenty-Sixth Amendment,
comports well with the republican case in favor of political rights
expansion, because it sought to remedy the incongruity that had existed
between the obligations of military service and the limitations on
participation in domestic politics.'57
that reasoning were never revisited in terms of appreciating the actual significance of basic
economic resources to all members of our polity. But see SMITH, supra note 15, at 163 (describing
Marshall's Rodriguez dissent as an instance in which this equation was revisited).
153. See AMY GUTMANN, LIBERAL EQUALITY 175 (1980).
154. Id.
155. See Michelman, supra note 8, at 1502-15 (describing republican models of participatory
governance); see also AMAR, supra note 7, at 9 ("The Federalists... [claimed] that a large and
modestly heterogeneous society could actually produce a more stable republic .... ").
156. See Steinfeld, supra note 62, at 350-53, 364-66. Tocqueville's Americans, while liberal
in outlook and individualistic in spirit, nevertheless took solace in the fact that they saw
themselves as political equals. See TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 17, at 503.
157. Wars abroad, in fact, have served for generations as wake-up calls for recognition of
rights at home. See PHILIP A. KLINKNER WITH ROGERS M. SMITH, THE UNSTEADY MARCH 136,
202, 317 (1999). We are all familiar with the old clich6 that it was hard to keep (white) boys down
on the farm once they had seen Paris. But how were we to keep the (black) boys down, in a more
literal sense of the word, once they had been treated as equals on the battlefield and had fought for
other people's-Americans' and foreigners'-freedom and democracy? The connection between
service and participatory membership is an important one, and the conferral of rights suggests the
degree to which democratic expansion comes when the polity believes would-be members have
demonstrated distinguished, commendable service to the commonwealth. Professor Ackerman has
argued:
Negroes had earned their claim to citizenship by sacrificing for the Union during the
darkest hours of the Civil War .... [Reconstruction was] a legal token of a more
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Building on this analysis, we should draw connections between those
efforts designed to promote political empowerment and those designed to
enhance socioeconomic well-being. There is a logic to having political
rights enshrined in the Constitution and having economic rights lag behind
in a temporal sense and, moreover, be set by the legislature. Such logic
undergirds the argument that political rights give people the power and the
opportunity to create whatever public policy ends they want.'5 8 There is a
sense that once everyone is brought to the town meeting and given a vote,
prudent policy will follow-and justice is ensured since everyone is present
at the table.
While there is no logical fallacy in that line of reasoning, there are both
intuitive and empirical reasons for challenging its accuracy. By simply
possessing the right to vote, one is not automatically transformed into an
empowered member of the polity. First, there is no qualitative consideration
of the effectiveness of that participation. Second, there is no guarantee that
certain individuals will be treated with dignity and respect when they lack
the socioeconomic capital almost universally enjoyed by political elites and
even the civically engaged middle class. Based on these assertions, I argue
that avenues to participation are not sufficiently open to ensure one arrives,
by virtue of her right to vote, at her deliberative destination. With that in
mind and with the arguments I have already asserted, I conclude by
identifying the right to minimal resource protection as one necessary for
political and civic participation.
H. Resources for Citizenship
It is helpful to look to scholars who challenge the conventional belief
that a basic right to participate is sufficient. Amy Gutmann argues:
By opening up opportunities for free and equal participation in
political life ... , an egalitarian society gives credence to the ideal
of equal moral persons.... Only by allowing and encouraging
equal opportunities for all citizens to participate in a variety of
spheres that affect their lives will citizens see themselves and be
seen as possessing equal dignity. ... [Yet to] deny effective equal
profound act of mutual recognition occurring among the American people
themselves.... IT]he citizenship clauses do not speak of rights at all, but make the
national government the guarantor of the privileges of citizenship.
Ackerman, supra note 93, at 104; see also id. at 110 (discussing thc reciprocal relationship
between the rights and duties of citizenship in the context of military service).
158. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); see also ELY,
supra note 62, at 87-101, 181 (describing his vision of reinforcing representative democracy).
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participatory rights or fair equality of participatory opportunities is
to deny the equal dignity of individual citizens. 5 9
Professor Zietlow concurs:
The relegation of the economic rights of the poor to the political
process creates a "Catch 22" for the poor, because the ability of
poor people to affect the political process is limited by their lack of
economic resources. A substantive approach to equal justice is
needed to facilitate the equal participation of the poor in the
political process. In order to achieve equality of participation, the
poor must have the substantive means to enable them to participate.
Therefore, a procedural approach to equal justice alone cannot
succeed even on its own terms. 16°
Indeed, even Chief Justice Stone appreciated that enfranchised discrete
and insular minorities would still be susceptible to attack in the legislative
realm. 6' Despite the Court's refusal to treat the poor as a discrete and
insular minority for purposes of heightened judicial review, there has been
no corollary consideration of the poor's insularity in purely participatory
terms-other than the procedural context in which the Court was supportive
of affirmative rights to protect negative, fundamental interests. Indeed, just
because the poor are not systematically discriminated against in ways that
would trigger strict scrutiny, it does not follow that the poor actually
possess the means to participate effectively. Traditionally, there must be
some intent to discriminate by outsiders in order to trigger suspect
classifications. 62 Yet my argument is that even though the Court does not
recognize the poor as suspect in this fashion, there may still be affirmative
obstacles in their path that demand the Court's-and Congress's-
attention. Academics recognize:
In order for formal participatory rights to become meaningful
and effective rights, both a minimum absolute level and a relative
equality of primary-good distribution must be guaranteed to all
citizens.... Recent studies of participation clearly indicate a wide
"participation gap" between citizens of low and high
socioeconomic status .... As the absolute level of education, and
of socioeconomic status in general, increases across the population,
so too does the absolute level of participation of low-status
groups ....
159. GUTMANN, supra note 153, at 181.
160. Zietlow, supra note 55, at 411-12; see also Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976
Term-Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1, 59
(1977) (discussing equal citizenship and equal access to goods and services generally).
161. See Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152.
162. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
1494 [Vol.111: 1457
Citizenship Welfare Rights
In order for effective equality of participatory opportunities...
to be achieved, welfare rights must be established for all citizens
and economic resources redistributed.
63
With this in mind, I suggest a recognition of the need to satisfy the very
basic elements of societal living in the polis. This suggestion is grounded,
of course, in the structural reformations of the Constitution. As Justice
Douglas reasoned in Griswold, and as Amar and Siegel suggest in terms of
affirming expansive women's rights by thinking about how the Nineteenth
Amendment affects our reading of the Fourteenth Amendment,"6 I would
look to all those amendments that empower different sets of groups along
political and economic lines as the foundation for such an enterprise.
For certain, the rights protected cannot just be those directly connected
with voting, which have already been protected by Harper and by the Poll
Tax Amendment. 16 5 Gutmann contends that "equal voting rights establish
only the most minimal participatory sphere .... [W]e cannot expect voting
rights to be intelligently exercised without effective participatory
opportunities in more immediate spheres of communal life." "6 We need a
more comprehensive, substantive foundation from which effective
citizenship and participation can flourish.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Note has suggested a rhetorical strategy and jurisprudential
framework in which to reconsider welfare rights. It surely does not attempt
to resolve all the problems, but merely offers a new paradigm for
consideration. But, assuming our country begins to appreciate the legal
imperative to secure affirmative resources as a prerequisite for meaningful
citizenship, it seems incumbent upon the legislative branch to take the lead.
As intimated above, a legislative awakening to the merits of civic
republicanism would confer great legitimacy and legality on the effort to
enhance affirmative welfare rights as they are connected to citizenship.167
163. GUTMANN, supra note 153, at 189, 196.
164. See Armar, supra note 118, at 28-30; Siegel, supra note 120.
165. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV.
166. GUTMANN, supra note 153, at 188.
167. Although the recognition of a constitutional right is often the judiciary's domain, the
instant right or set of rights may pose particular difficulties for Article III courts. The
disinclination to make policy, to abandon precedent, and to expand the traditional bounds of
justiciability complicate ajudicial response.
First, there has been a long tradition of courts' refraining from making affirmative policy.
Any effort to operationalize a right to effective citizenship may be beyond the bench's scope and
expertise. But beyond that prudential concern, even when the Court has recognized rights as
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These rights could, perhaps, take the form of an array of vouchers tagged to
the essential socioeconomic resources necessary to undergird participation
as it is broadly understood.'68 To have citizenship welfare rights affirmed by
the people's representatives would give a particularly democratic gloss to
the identified constitutional imperative.
We can look, for starters, in the direction of other congressional
imperatives surrounding important rhetorical phrases of the Constitution,
specifically the phrases to "promote the general Welfare," '69 and to
"provide for the ... general Welfare," 170 as well as the Declaration of
Independence's "Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness.""'7 Professor
Charles Black proffers analogous examples, including the constitutional
fundamental, it has been hesitant to impose affirmative obligations on legislatures and force them
to help rights-bearers take advantage of their rights. For example, in two cases involving abortion
funding, the Court reaffirmed the right of a woman to have an abortion, but expressly refused to
compel states to finance abortions as part of government health-care programs. See Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 318 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469 (1977). Dissenting in Maher,
Justice Brennan argued that the failure to provide funds for abortion should be considered
comparable to a failure to waive court fees, thus making Maher difficult to square with Griffin and
Boddie. Maher, 432 U.S. at 483, 488 (Brennan, J., dissenting). More generally, the Court has had
a chance to discuss the Constitution's affirmative obligations in DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989). The DeShaney Court refused to hold the
state government affirmatively responsible for neglecting the needs of an abused child--even
after that abuse had been brought to its officers' attention. Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned:
[N]othing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the State to protect
the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private actors. The
Clause is phrased as a limitation on the State's power to act, not as a guarantee of
certain minimal levels of safety and security .... [Ilts language cannot fairly be
extended to impose an affirmative obligation on the State....
... Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to governmental
aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests
of which the government itself may not deprive the individual.
Id. at 195-96.
Second, to reverse the patterns of precedent would be very difficult. Even assuming that
there is a considerable republican interest in citizenship welfare, the Court would still have to
confront its liberal decisions regarding the limitations inherent in a doctrine of negative rights.
Prudentially, the Court may want to avoid those sets of pitfalls. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-69 (1994) (reaffirming the power of stare decisis).
Third, it might be difficult to grant standing for an injured party. While there may be an
abstract constitutional right to effective participation, an injury in fact may be hard to
demonstrate. It may be difficult to quantify effective participation and it would certainly be
difficult to determine what remedy at law a court could offer. Given these obstacles, a court may
never reach these erstwhile meritorious claims. For a general discussion of complications arising
out of Article Ii courts, see, for example, FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 2.26,
at 134-37 (5thed. 2001), which describes how a plaintiff may meet the requirements to bring suit.
168. It is well beyond the scope of this Note to contemplate what these rights might look like
in practice. But very briefly, we might consider health care, food, shelter, and education as basic
necessities for democratic participation. Access to these resources would have to be conditioned,
of course, on some demonstration of a concerted effort to participate in civic or political affairs.
169. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
170. Id. art. I, § 8.
171. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
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assertion that Congress shall provide for the national defense.172 This vague
mandate is taken quite seriously by our government even though there is no
further explicit obligation to build and maintain a sizable army. The same
implied mandate is true, for Professor Black, with the census.'73 In the
Census Clause, there is an implication of carrying out a constitutional
mandate-and carrying it out well. Black considers these imperatives to be
duties held in trust, not text. Both the census and the national defense
examples establish "that the systematic frame of constitutional rights and
duties can comfortably contain, and quite evidently does contain, a duty not
expressly declared as such, but of vast scope and highest essentiality, a duty
derived from the grant of power held in trust." '74 Contemplated in light of
the constitutional authorization to promote the common welfare and in light
of the civic and economic welfare-enhancing amendments, a case for
affirmative citizenship rights demands consideration comparable to the
national defense and census-taking mandates.
Professor Black founds his assertion for welfare rights on textual
phrases asserting rights to the pursuit of happiness as well as on
congressional imperatives to promote the general welfare:
[T]he possession of a decent material basis for life is an
indispensable condition, to almost all people and at almost all
times, to this "pursuit" [of happiness]. The lack of this basis-the
thing we call "poverty" -is ... the commonest, the grimmest, the
stubbornest obstacle we know to the pursuit of happiness. I have
suggested that poverty may be the leading cause of death; it is
pretty certain that it is the leading cause, at least amongst material
causes, of despair in life.'
Black's assertiveness regarding congressional imperatives must be
balanced, of course, against our recognition that frequent and competitive
elections for seats in Congress may give new meaning to Justice Jackson's
oft-quoted remark that the Constitution should not be a "suicide pact." 176
Simply put, today's political consensus supports only very attenuated
welfare benefits. Thus even with legal prodding, it is doubtful that Congress
172. See Black, supra note 92, at 1113-14; see also U.S. CONST. pmbl.; id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
173. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 3.
174. Black, supra note 92, at 1114.
175. Id. at 1106.
176. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (arguing that an
absolutist protection of free speech rights may threaten, in the long run, our democratic way of
life); see also Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963) (using the phrase
"suicide pact" to describe a decision to protect a particular right even though that protection
would undermine the broader purpose and ideals of the American constitutional system).
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will act authoritatively any time soon to bolster affirmative welfare
rights.
177
Pragmatic difficulties notwithstanding, there are from a conceptual
standpoint real jurisprudential, normative, and empirical justifications for
looking to classical republicanism as a constitutional value that is alive and
vibrant. It is here that we must recognize that the power to participate
meaningfully in the political system may not be taken for granted. Once we
have arrived at this recognition, we must begin to contemplate effective
strategies to secure the legal, political, and financial capital necessary to
remedy this oversight.
177. In 1996, Congress overhauled the American welfare system. Promising to end welfare
as we know it, President Clinton signed a widely supported bill that ended Americans' entitlement
to welfare. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). Spurred on by a desire
to cut the budget, promote work, and curb dependency, the welfare reform advocates have
captured the public agenda and have not weakened their grip. See, e.g., Mickey Kaus, Editorial,
Who's the Real Beltway Candidate, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2000, at A25 (declaring the
righteousness of the 1996 welfare reform-bill); Martin Peretz, War on Words, NEW REPUBLIC,
Sept. 6, 1999, at 46 (calling Bill Bradley's vote against the 1996 welfare reform proposal "wildly
out of step with public opinion"). For additional background information on this wave of welfare
reform, see Dan Morgan, A Revolution Derailed, WASH. POST, Oct. 20, 1996, at CI; and
Editorial, Where Welfare Stands, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1997, at D16.
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